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ScienceDirectMaking decisions under uncertainty, from perceptual
judgments to reward-guided choices, requires combining
multiple pieces of decision-relevant information — a cognitive
process modeled as statistical inference. In such conditions,
human and animal decisions exhibit a large suboptimal
variability whose origin and structure remains poorly
understood. This variability is usually hypothesized as noise at
the periphery of inferential processes, namely sensory noise in
perceptual tasks and stochastic exploration in reward-guided
learning, or as suboptimal biases in inference per se. Here we
outline a theoretical framework aiming at characterizing the
origin and structure of choice variability in uncertain
environments, with an emphasis on the computational
imprecision of inferential processes usually overlooked in the
literature. We indicate how to modify existing computational
models and behavioral paradigms to dissociate computational
imprecisions from suboptimal biases in inference.
Computational imprecisions have critical consequences for
understanding the notion of optimality in decision-making.
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From normative to algorithmic descriptions of
decision-making
In uncertain or changing environments, making decisions
requires combining multiple pieces of ambiguous or con-
flicting information. In such conditions, human choices
exhibit a suboptimal variability whose origin and structure
remains poorly specified to date [1,2,3]. Normative
descriptions of decision-making in terms of optimal sta-
tistical inference — defined by the Bayes theorem of
probabilistic inference [4] — have provided commonwww.sciencedirect.com metrics to quantify human performance in various deci-
sion problems, ranging from visual search [5] to reward-
guided learning [6]. However, this approach falls short of
explaining the pervasive variability and sub-optimality of
human decisions and its implications in terms of cognitive
and neural architecture [7].
These limitations have to do with the level of description
at which Bayesian formulations are set [8,9]. Indeed,
normative descriptions seek by definition to characterize
the ‘computational’ problems that the brain tries to solve
in terms of information processing. In this regard, Bayes-
ian models of perception have been tremendously help-
ful in showing that humans perform inference on noisy
sensory signals using contextual knowledge (or ‘priors’)
about their environment. This computational descrip-
tion of brain function, inspired by the pioneering work of
Helmholtz in the late 1800s, is still very influential in the
field [10]. However, and despite recent attempts [11,12],
this function-level description of the brain as an ‘infer-
ence machine’ remains inherently blind to its neurobio-
logical implementation — that is, the ‘representational’
or ‘algorithmic’ level of description according to
Marr’s hierarchy. In particular, one can write virtually
any departure from the Bayesian optimum as a mixture
of wrong priors and probabilistic (‘softmax’) decision
rules in an otherwise optimal inference process [7]
(Figures 1–3).
Dominant views go as far as proposing sensory noise (at
the input of the decision process) to be the dominant
source of choice suboptimality in perceptual tasks [13–
15], whereas stochasticity in response selection (at the
output of the decision process) would cause suboptimal
reward-guided choices in the purpose of ‘random’ explo-
ration of environmental contingencies [16,17] (see also
[18,19] for a comparison between ‘directed’ and ‘random’
forms of exploration). However, the behavioral para-
digms on which these claims are based cannot distinguish
choice suboptimality originating from the peripheries of
the decision process from computational imprecisions in
inference, at the core of the decision process. This
distinction requires adapting current computational
models of decision-making which either make the as-
sumption that inferential computations are performed
with infinite precision (such as the updating of beliefs in
probabilistic learning models, see [6]) or do not specify
the origin of observed variability in the decision variable
(such as random-walk drifts in sequential sampling mod-
els, see [20]).Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 11:109–115
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Theoretical distinction between three sources of choice variability and suboptimality. Computational description of decision-making as statistical
inference: evidence from stimulus s, corresponding to the likelihood of stimulus features given possible generative hypotheses H, is accumulated
across stimuli in the form of a decision variable DV, corresponding to the posterior belief of possible generative hypotheses given observed
stimuli, and finally translated into an appropriate action a. Two mapping rules control: (a) which stimulus features are relevant for the decision, at
the input of the inference process, and (b) the ‘task set’ which determines which action to take depending on the decision variable, at the output
of the inference process. Three sources of variability can affect the decision process: (1) sensory noise during the processing of decision-relevant
stimulus features (green), (2) probabilistic action selection in the purpose of exploration (purple), and (3) imperfections in inference (yellow).
Sensory noise is stimulus-dependent but task-independent, whereas inferential imperfections should depend on the complexity of the inference
process (e.g., the number of possible generative hypotheses to choose from). Probabilistic action selection, in contrast to inferential imperfections,
is independent from the number of inference steps performed (i.e., the number of presented stimuli minus one) to reach a decision.Modifying theory and practice to quantify
inferential imprecisions
At the theoretical level, identifying the origin of choice
suboptimality requires to compare human or animal
choice accuracy to the statistical optimum — defined in
terms of noise-free probabilistic inference. In this frame-
work, statistical optimality is defined as a fixed upper
bound on choice accuracy, and choice suboptimality as
departures from statistically optimal behavior. At the
practical level, however, it is often impossible to dissoci-
ate the impact of inferential imprecisions on choice sub-
optimality from ‘peripheral’ variability (at the sensory
and/or response selection stages) in classical behavioral
paradigms.
To measure inferential imprecisions in decision-making
separately from sensory variability, one needs to distin-
guish the decision space in which inference is per-
formed from the relevant sensory feature(s) of the
presented samples (whose sensory discriminability is
known on the basis of past literature or can be measured
empirically). In practice, one can use a non-linear map-
ping between sensory features and decision categories,
or compare conditions using identical stimuli but
different numbers of decision categories. In suchCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 11:109–115 conditions, one can estimate the predicted impact of
inferential imprecisions on choice variability, indepen-
dently from sensory variability. To distinguish inferen-
tial imprecisions from variability in response selection
(e.g., a probabilistic ‘softmax’ selection rule), one also
needs an experimental condition where random explo-
ration is neither necessary nor useful. This is by defini-
tion the case in perceptual categorization tasks where
subjects are observers of the environment — that is,
stimuli act as cues about a hidden state of the environ-
ment, not as outcomes of previous actions. Reward-
guided learning tasks, which rely heavily on exploration,
can be modified to include a condition where random
exploration is useless — for example, by providing
‘counter-factual’ feedback from unchosen alternatives
simultaneously with feedback from the chosen action
[21,22]. Indeed, in this condition, the decision-maker
is provided with current values of both chosen and
unchosen alternatives, and has thus no incentive for
random exploration of unchosen alternatives [16].
Selective modifications of classical protocols used to
study human perceptual and reward-guided decisions
can therefore be made to distinguish between sources of
variability at the sensory, inference and response selec-
tion stages.www.sciencedirect.com
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Distinguishing inferential imprecisions from other candidate sources of choice variability. (a) Theoretical and experimental distinction between
inferential imprecisions and sensory noise. Left panel: two independent perceptual decisions. The measured perceptual sensitivity to each of the
two stimuli s1 and s2 can be used to predict a perceptual sensitivity to the combination of s1 and s2, assuming noisy sensory processing followed
optimal statistical inference. Right panel: two sequential perceptual decisions (on the basis of two stimuli drawn from the same perceptual
category). The second decision is made on the basis of the two same stimuli — that is, results from mental inference. The measured perceptual
sensitivity to the combination of s1 and s2 can thus be compared to the predicted estimate assuming optimal statistical inference. A discrepancy
between predicted and observed perceptual sensitivities indicates the presence of inferential imprecisions during the combination of s1 and s2
which impacts the second decision. (b) Theoretical and experimental distinction between inferential imprecisions and probabilistic selection during
a typical probabilistic reversal learning paradigm. Left panel: predictions from a probabilistic selection source of choice variability. Successive
stimuli sk and sk+1 are drawn from the same generative category, with a reversal probability prev. A probabilistic action selection policy predicts
that the decision variable follows deterministically the predictions of optimal statistical inference given observed stimuli, and results in no repetition
bias across successive actions. Right panel: predictions from an inferential source of choice variability. Inferential imprecisions predict that the
variability on the decision variable after stimulus sk propagates to the decision variable after stimulus sk+1, and results in a repetition bias across
successive actions whose magnitude scales with the extent of inferential imprecisions.
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 11:109–115
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Figure 3
modeling choice variability in terms of a bias-variance trade-off
o
bs
er
ve
d 
ch
oi
ce
va
ria
bi
lity
 (σ
2 )
# modeled biases
normative model
(parameter-f ree)
suboptimal model
(several parameters)
0
variance term
(unpredictable)
bias term
(predictable)
bias-variance
trade-off
B
A
fitted computational
model to choices
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 
Modeling choice variability in terms of a bias-variance trade-off. The
observed choice variability resulting from fits of multiple computational
models to the same choice data should decrease when true
underlying suboptimal biases in inference are fitted to the data — in
contrast to the normative (statistically optimal) model which makes
correct assumptions about the generative structure of the task. The
bias-variance trade-off can be expressed in terms of the proportion of
observed choice variability fitted using the normative model explained
by a suboptimal model including all biases present in decision-makers.
A key challenge consists in devising an experimental strategy which
affords to estimate this bias-variance trade-off without having to
assume explicitly all possible biases which could be present in tested
decision-makers — which is unobservable in experimental conditions.
Current computational models and theories predict that the variance
term resulting from inferential imprecisions is negligible (a). However,
preliminary data from our lab [40] suggests that human choice
variability during perceptual categorization is constituted of a large
variance term (b) which amounts to about two thirds of the overall
choice variability measured in this task.In terms of computational modeling, inferential impreci-
sions bear a specific statistical signature on choice behav-
ior which can be distinguished from variability in sensory
processing or action selection. Indeed, inferential impre-
cisions produce correlated drifts of the decision variable
across inference ‘steps’ (i.e., the combination of a current
belief with new incoming information) — which should
increase in spread with the number of presented samples
and with the complexity of the inference being performed
(e.g., the number of sensory dimensions relevant for the
decision, or the number of possible alternatives to choose
from). By contrast, the correlated drifts in the decision
variable predicted by sensory noise should depend
solely on the discriminability of the relevant sensory
features, and not on the complexity of inference. Sto-
chasticity in response selection, in turn, should be uncor-
related across successive decisions, and should not
depend on the complexity of inference. It is therefore
possible, given an appropriate protocol: (1) to design
theoretical models featuring distinct (or combinations
of) sources of choice suboptimality, and (2) to quantify
the respective and distinct contributions of variability in
sensory, inference and response selection to human andCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 11:109–115 animal performance — instead of assuming a particular
source of choice variability.
Distinguishing bias and variance terms of
inferential imprecisions
Dominant psychological theories have attributed decision
suboptimality to a mixture of cognitive biases and random
noise. As a prime example of this dual nature of decision
suboptimality, signal detection theory [23] has theorized
the detection of a noisy sensory signal by human obser-
vers along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) the sensory
detectability of the signal — corresponding to the quality
of perceptual processing, and (2) the decision criterion
used by the observer to report the signal as present —
corresponding to a cognitive bias which affords to label
observers as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ as a function of their
decision criterion. Dynamic extensions of signal detec-
tion theory offered by sequential sampling models [20]
hypothesize a similar distinction between the rate of the
drifting decision particle and the level of the criterion at
which a decision is taken — which controls the speed-
accuracy tradeoff of the decision maker.
Similarly, inferential imprecisions can be of two forms,
which can be formally distinguished in terms of the bias-
variance trade-off found in estimator theory. Inferential
imprecisions can be in part deterministic (i.e., the ‘bias’
term) and reflect fixed, systematic approximations or
heuristics in the algorithms used to perform inference.
In fact, recent theories postulate that most of the sub-
optimality of human decisions is caused by such deter-
ministic imprecisions [1], due in part to the intractability
of statistically optimal inference in environments featur-
ing complex correlation structures [2]. By contrast, the
intrinsic stochasticity of inference imprecisions (i.e., the
‘variance’ term) reflects the effective precision at which
inference is performed.
Fractioning observed choice suboptimality between
these two forms of inferential imprecisions remains an
open challenge [3], which strongly limits the ability of
computational modeling efforts to understand the origin
and structure of suboptimality in human and animal
decision-making. Indeed, the variability term fitted by
a computational model (e.g., an additive noise spread, or a
choice ‘temperature’) can reflect both core stochasticity in
the decision-maker, but also biases not captured by the
computational model. Therefore, quantifying the fraction
of choice suboptimality ultimately attributable to biased
computations provides a measure of the core stochasticity
of mental inference — and thus of the core unpredict-
ability of the decision-maker.
We propose that the effective precision of inference con-
stitutes an important source of choice suboptimality in the
canonical protocols used to study decision-making, from
perceptual categorization (where inference is modeled bywww.sciencedirect.com
Choice variability and suboptimality Wyart and Koechlin 113sequential evidence accumulation, see, e.g., [20]) to re-
ward-guided learning (where inference is modeled by
sequential probabilistic learning of action-outcome asso-
ciations, see, e.g., [6]). Inference should be seen as a
biologically costly computation in the decision process,
which can only be performed by large populations of
neurons at a limited computational precision. By assigning
suboptimality to the peripheries (input or output) of the
decision process, and therefore by assuming implicitly that
inferential imprecisions are negligible, current computa-
tional models likely overestimate sensory noise in percep-
tual tasks where noisy sensory samples need to be
combined and accumulated over time [14], and likely
overestimate exploratory/foraging behavior in reward-
guided learning tasks where reward-maximizing actions
need to be taken in face of a volatile environment [6,17].
Consequences of inferential imprecisions for
decision theory
Hypothesizing the existence of sizable inferential impre-
cisions during decision-making has far-reaching conse-
quences regarding not only its function, but also known
and pervasive cognitive biases in decision-making. First,
in tasks featuring sequential decisions (such as reward-
guided learning tasks), repetition biases can be seen as an
overt manifestation of inferential imprecisions in the
updating of the decision variable which are correlated
across successive decisions. More specifically, postulating
inferential imprecisions leads to a quantitative (and em-
pirically testable) relationship between the spread of
inferential imprecisions (which can be estimated by fit-
ting it as a model parameter) and the magnitude of the
repetition bias (which can be measured empirically in
human choices). In practice, the repetition bias is
expected to grow positively with inferential imprecisions,
both within and across decision-makers.
A second important question concerns the potential func-
tion of inferential imprecisions: why have these ‘errors’ not
been canceled through natural selection if they constrain
substantially the accuracy and consistency of decision-
making? In stable environments where the information
is highly redundant, inferential errors are likely to be
outweighed by the amount of available information and
have thus a minimal impact on behavior. However, in
uncertain and/or volatile environments, inferential impre-
cisions are not necessarily detrimental to decision accura-
cy. Indeed, inferring the volatility (i.e., the rate of change)
of the environment using explicit, normative computations
is very costly [6] and leads typically only to small improve-
ments in obtained rewards. Inferential imprecisions can
offer an implicit tracking of environmental volatility at a
zero computational cost. Indeed, if the spread of inferential
imprecisions scales positively with the magnitude of the
performed inference step — as predicted by the pervasive
‘Weber law’ observed in behavior and neural activity, then
the impact of inferential imprecisions on choice behaviorwww.sciencedirect.com should grow with volatility and thus trigger more random
exploration in more volatile environments (see also [24] for
an ‘extreme’ switch to random behavior in rodents in
unpredictable environments).
Postulating the existence of inferential imprecisions
raises important questions regarding the decision-maker’s
knowledge of these imprecisions. Indeed, the notion of
statistical optimality defined above does not consider
computational constraints (such as inferential impreci-
sions) in the decision process. Consequently, computa-
tions considered as ‘biased’ in terms of statistical
optimality, such as the pervasive ‘recency’ effect ob-
served across tasks and species [25], can be seen as the
consequence of an optimization of computations in a
biological system which features sizable inferential
imprecisions. Indeed, in a biological system poised with
inferential imprecisions, prior beliefs become progres-
sively less reliable over time due to propagating errors
and should be down-weighted in the face of new incom-
ing evidence — as a function of the perceived reliability
of the incoming evidence. In other words, postulating
inferential imprecisions requires to revisit the hypothe-
sized suboptimal nature of cognitive biases from the
perspective of a biological system with no variability in
inference.
Last, if the behavioral expression of variability in infer-
ence can be dissociated from variability in sensory pro-
cessing and response selection, then it should be
selectively modulated by certain cognitive variables, such
as executive attention and/or training. Describing infer-
ence as a biologically costly process implies that the
computational precision of inference should be selec-
tively and flexibly adapted to the cognitive demands of
the environment. In practice, humans should increase the
precision of inference when it is deemed necessary (in the
absence of contextual information, or under high mone-
tary incentives) and decrease it when they can rely on
computationally ‘cheaper’ sources of information about
their environment. This results in a predicted trade-off
between the amount of contextual information available
to the decision maker and the precision of inference being
performed to make a decision. Note that such trade-off is
suboptimal in information terms (where the precision of
inference should always be maximized), but optimal in
biological terms if inference is assumed to bear a sizable
biological cost for the organism. Executive attention
should be able to modulate selectively the computational
precision of inference (i.e., independently of sensory
discriminability or response selection variability) as a
function of the cognitive resources which can be allocated
to inference [26,27]. By contrast, extensive training
should influence not the precision of inference per se,
but instead reduce systematic inferential imperfections
(biases) resulting from approximate or wrong assumptions
about the generative structure of the environment.Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2016, 11:109–115
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inferential imprecisions
Quantifying inferential imprecisions can be performed at
several levels, from single-cell recordings from neurons in
brain regions representing the relevant sensory features to
be combined (such as motion-sensitive cells during the
presentation of a random-dot kinematogram, see, e.g.,
[28,29]) or the decision variable [30], to the behavioral
accuracy of the resulting decisions. Measuring neural
variability in particular brain regions have proved difficult
to relate to the psychometric accuracy of the decision
maker [31] — in part due to the presence of noise corre-
lations which complicate the interpretation of neural
measures of stimulus and choice sensitivity [32,33].
Besides, neural correlates of inferential imprecisions
could reflect not only the precision of cortical representa-
tions decodable from multi-dimensional neural record-
ings from parietal and prefrontal regions [34,35], but also
neuromodulatory influences from basal ganglia circuits
(see, e.g., [36,37] in humans and [38,39] in songbirds). We
argue that a behavioral quantification of inferential impre-
cisions — through a paradigm which affords to simulate
optimal behavior — provides a particularly adequate
method to measure the effective, function-level precision
of underlying neural computations.
In other words, considering how much information is lost
due to suboptimal computations provides an estimation of
the effective precision of the decision process. Important-
ly, this effective precision sets an upper bound on the
accuracy and predictability of human and animal deci-
sions which, as we have outlined above, has important
consequences in terms of its function and the existence of
well-characterized cognitive biases (such as repetition
biases or recency effects). Quantifying and comparing
the computational precision of inference in humans and
animals in a wide range of decision problems thus con-
stitutes an important empirical and theoretical challenge
for cognitive research at large in future years.
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